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A truck driver for the defendant ice cream company, while lifting a
100-pound table as usual to move it into position to load packages of
ice cream onto his truck, suffered a hernia and died after an operation.
Although the only unusual event was the injury itself, recovery was
awarded under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act.1
The courts are in agreement that where an accidental means is fol-
lowed by an accidental result compensation will be awarded ;2 but where
there is an accidental result alone, with no separate distinguishable acci-
dental means, there is a diversity of opinion as to the compensability of
the injury.3
The majority decisions are to the effect that the injury itself should
be considered the compensable accident. 4 These decisions are based
upon the English case of Fenton v. Thorley,5 where the court adopted a
purely subjective test, holding that it is only necessary that the harm or
injury be unexpected. Most American courts say that this view effectu-
ates the liberal construction of the act; and that where, as here, the
meaning is plain, the words "injury by accident" should be given their
popular and ordinary interpretationO including an injury which is itself
the accident without necessity for an unusual effort or strain.7 "If a
'Derby v. Swift and Co., 49 S. E. 2d 417 (Va. 1948). The applicable statutes
are: VA. CODE ANN., §1887 (2d), "'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." As to
hernia: VA. CODE ANN., §1887 (2e), "That the hernia immediately followed an
accident." The comparable North Carolina statutes are N. C. GEN. STAT., §97-2(f)
and §97-2(r) (1943). The construction of "accident" in the personal injury and
hernia statutes is the same. Derby v. Swift and Co., supra; Hardware Mut. Cas-
ualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393, 24 S. E. 2d 315 (1943).
- Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 42 S. E. 2d 96 (1947) (police
officer, who arrested a violently resisting drunk weighing 180 pounds, had to carry
him up three flights of steps since the jail elevator was out of order and collapsed
at the top from dilation of the heart) ; Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co.,
224 N. C. 841, 32 S. E. 2d 623 (1944) (work of caulking pipe joints with hot lead
increased the outside temperature of 104 degrees from /2 degree to 10 degrees
more. Held: this is "the straw that breaks the camel's back."); Moore v. Engi-
neering and Sales Co., 214 N. C. 424, 199 S. E. 605 (1938) (had not lifted pipes
of this weight before) ; Bates v. Spruce Pine Store, 9615 (1941) N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. (1947), p. 25 (while cranking a tractor on a particularly cold morning claim-
ant bursted a blood vessel) ; Crowell v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 9871 (1940)
N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1947), p. 25 (lifted especially heavy weight).
4 SCHNEIDER, WORICMEN'S ComPENsATIo LAW 384 (3rd ed. 1946).
' Ibid.
L. R. App. Cas. 443 (1903). Followed in Clover, Clayton and Co. v. Hughes,
1910 A. C. 242 (tightening nut in usual manner resulted in a ruptured blood ves-
sel) ; and Walker v. Bairds and Dalmellington, Ltd., 153 L. T. 322 (1935). Note,
47 JURID. Ray. 418-9 (1935).
' E.g., Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co. v. Brown, 228 Ala. 460, 153 So. 642
(1934); Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 147 N. E. 366 (1925);
Giguere v. Whiting Co., 107 Vt. 151, 177 Atl. 313 (1935). See Conrad v. Cook-
Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N. C. 723, 153 S. E. 266 (1930).
"Duff Dotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So. 2d 790 (1942) (usual lifting of
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workman's physical structure... gives way under the stress of his usual
labor, his death is an accident which arises out of his employment."
On the other hand, a minority of the courts say that this view would
make the act provide for insurance against disease and injury rather
than against accident.9 Those following this view, which England fol-
lowed before Fenton v. Thorley,1° hold that it is not enough that the
result be unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen, but that the means also
must be accidental."1
The North Carolina decisions are not in accord among themselves
as to the proper interpretation to be accorded the act.12
There is one line of decisions following the majority view. In
Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co.,13 where a milk deliveryman suf-
fered a hernia while lifting a smaller ice box out of a larger one as he
"usually did every day," it was expressly held that an accidental result
alone is sufficient on which to base an award for compensation. Justice
Seawell there said that "If the influences, often complex and minute,
which bring it (an accident) about were capable of exact analysis, it
would lose its character as an accident."'1 4  There are dicta in other
opinions to support this view,"5 as well as at least two decisions of the
pot of meat); Brown v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174
S. E. 359 (1934) (stooped over to pick up a tool, knee injury, no slip or outside
physical force); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393, 24
S. E. 2d 315 (1943) (no slipping or unusual lift) ; Roehl v. Graw, 161 Tenn. 461,
32 S. W. 2d 1049 (1930) (hernia from pushing concrete mixer as usual); Mc-
Cormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor, 7 Wash. 2d 40, 108 P. 2d 807
(1941) (injured while cutting trees, no unusual effort or strain). For more cases
see Horovitz, Current Trends it Workmen's Compensation 12 L. Soc'y J. 499-501
(1947); HoaovrTz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
88 (1944).
'Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, 275, 146 P. 2d 657, 659 (1944)
(lifted freight caused acute coronary thrombosis). Accord: Carroll v. Industrial
Commission, 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921) ; Brown's Case, 123 Me. 424, 123
Atl. 421 (1924) (shoveling snow from roof with dilation of heart resulting) ; Pat-
rick v. Ham, 119 Me. 517, 111 AtI. 912 (1921) (lifting 100 pound sack of grain
as usual caused cerebral hemorrhage).
'State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S. W. 2d
40 (1941) (suffered stroke when he picked up a 45 pound bucket of water).
"0 L. R. App. Cas. 443 (1903). Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Work-
men's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 328, 339 (1912).
" Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P. 2d 1017 (1933) ; Marlow
v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N. W. 130 1935) (apoplexy from
lifting mail sacks as usual) ; Guthrie v. Detroit Shipbuilding Co., 200 Mich. 355,
167 N. W. 37 (1918); Gottfried v. State Industrial Comm'n, 168 Ore. 65, 120 P.
2d 970 (1942) (stooped over quickly to pick up a fallen bun, recovery denied).
2 See KEEcH, WORICMEN'S COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA, C. 2 (1942)
for a general legislative history of the Workmen's Compensation Act in North
Carolina.
12217 N. C. 468, 8 S. E. 2d 231 (1940). Cf. Buchanan v. State Highway and
Public Works Comm'n, 217 N. C. 173, 7 S. E. 2d 382 (1940).
14 Smith case, supra, at 472, 8 S. E. 2d 231, 233.
15 Love v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N. C. 28, 30, 1 S. E. 2d 121, 122 (1939)
("the words 'undesigned' or 'unforeseen' refer to the result produced, and not to
its cause") ; Brown v. Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 767, 32 S. E. 2d 320, 322
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Industrial Commission.' 6 In an extensive concurring opinion in Ed-
wards v. Piedmont Publishing Co.,'7 Justice Seawell reiterates the same
views.
But there are also decisions pointing in the direction of the minority
holding. Compensation was denied in Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills8
where deceased, wearing special clothing in cleaning and scouring
machines, got wet, and being hot, died from pneumonia after going
outside to empty ashes. Chief Justice Stacy said that the conditions
were not unusal and unexpected and that the deceased was doing his
usual work in his usual and customary way. In Neely v. City of States-
ville,"' where a fire chief died of a heart attack from the heat, smoke,
excitement, and physical exertion at a fire, Justice Winborne said that
since there must be an accident followed by an injury and since deceased
was doing his usual work in the expected surrounding conditions re-
covery should be denied. 20 The majority in Edwards v. Piedmont Pub-
lishing Co. s2 apparently base their decision on similar grounds. The
Industrial Commission has also reached like results.
2 2
Since the employee is contributing as much to his employer's benefit
when he is injured while doing his usual work in the usual and ordinary
way as when he slips or lifis a heavy weight, there appears no good
reason why the court should not follow the majority view of the main
case. Further, there appears to be no clear line of demarcation be-
tween accidental means and accidental result, with cases probably being
decided against the injured because this distinction is not made. To
placate the fears of the minority that the majority view provides in-
(1944) (an accident is "an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected
or designed by the person who suffers the injury"). Both these cases are dis-
tinguishable from the main case on the facts.
" Caple v. Woodal and Woodal, 8271 (1938) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1947),
p. 26 (head of biceps pulled loose from the shoulder when claimant lifted plaster
weighing 111 pounds in the ordinary manner); Newton v. Wilmington, 6615
(1937) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1947), p. 26 (officer in prior good health had a
heart attack while subduing a criminal, no showing of unusual exertion).
17227 N. C. 184, 41 S. E. 2d 592 (1947) (employee had picked up a 40-50
pound plate and was turning in a twisting manner to hand it to another when he
ruptured a vertebral disc).
' 209 N. C. 823, 184 S. E. 844 (1936)." 212 N. C. 365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937).
" In Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N. C. 468, 8 S. E. 2d 231 (1940),
Justice Seawell makes an attempt, apparently futile, to distinguish that case from
the Slade and Neely cases by saying that in the two latter cases the injuries were
a natural and probable result of the work being done.
227 N. C. 184, 41 S. E. 2d 592 (1947) (Justice Seawell concurring, said the
facts showed claimant was doing his usual work in the usual way, yet compen-
sation should be given).
2 Woods v. Construction Dept. of Duke Univ., 8832 (1939) N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. (1947), p. 25.
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surance against injury,23 there is still a ,requirement that the accident
arise out of and be in the course of the employment.
It is believed that it will be to the best interests of all concerned
for North Carolina to align itself definitely with the majority and hold
that the accidental result alone is to be considered the compensable
accident.
KIRBY SULLIVAN.
Insurance against injury seems to be a very desirable goal, but such an
enactment should be left to the legislature, or the employer could voluntarily adopt
such a plan.
